With the development of mobile communication networks and intelligent terminals, recent years have witnessed a rapid popularization of location-based service (LBS). While obtaining convenient services, the exploitation of mass location data is inevitably leading to a serious concern about location privacy security. Obviously, high quality of service (QoS) will result in poor location privacy protection, so that a trade-off is needed to fulfill users' individual demands for both sides. Although existing methods perform well in certain scenarios, few have considered the abovementioned balance problem. Therefore, by combining -anonymity-based cloaking technique and obfuscation method, a new distributed user-demand-driven (DUDD) location privacy protection scheme is put forward in this paper. The basic idea is still to select a subcloaking area within the cloaking area generated by Location Anonymization Server. Moreover, by using the improved LBS system model, this paper constructs a distributed framework, in which location privacy protection is wholly occupied in server side and LBS provider is only dedicated to QoSguarantee. In addition, normalized privacy demand and QoS metrics are given and a user-defined weight parameter is introduced to ensure location privacy security without decreasing QoS. The feasibility of the proposed method is proved through simulation.
Introduction
Recently, the popularization of intelligent terminals such as smart phones and the growing of mobile network coverage have provided location-based service (LBS) with various fields of applications. LBS employs mobile communication networks or Global Positioning System (GPS) to obtain the location information of mobile users. With the help of Geographic Information System (GIS) platform, it offers users many value-added services, including navigation services, life assisted services, social services, and commercial push services [1] .
In order to get access to all these convenient services, it is a prerequisite for users to furnish their own location information to service providers. The acquisition as well as exploitation of mass location data inevitably leads to location privacy issues because sensitive data like location information can easily expose users' work places, places of residence, travel destinations, and even their precise locations at a certain 2 International Journal of Distributed Sensor Networks gradually showing a personalized trend with the increase of user demands [6] . Although those existing methods have performed very well, there exist some unavoidable limitations. The anonymity-based method is commonly used in LBS, but it is vulnerable to the background information attack (edge information attack) and, moreover, it has a limited protection degree while being applied alone [7] . Nevertheless, the computational complexity of obfuscation-based method is considerably high. What is more, to the best of our knowledge, few approaches take users' individual demands for location privacy and QoS into consideration.
Hence, in order to improve the effectiveness of location privacy protection and to reduce the computational complexity, this paper proposes a new algorithm of location privacy protection to meet users' individual demands and to seek the balance between location privacy protection and QoS, which is in combination with k-anonymity-based cloaking technique and obfuscation method. First, users initialize and send their LBS queries to Location Anonymization Server and, at the same time, forward a parameter called type of service (ToS) to LBS provider to declare the types of services. Then, the server and LBS provider will return to users, respectively, their restrictions on the distance between the real user location and the subcloaking area. Meanwhile, in the first step, Location Anonymization Server generates a large cloaking area according to users' desired privacy protection degree and returns it to users. Second, users select a subcloaking area a(c) within this large cloaking area by applying a selection algorithm and then send it back to LBS provider. Finally, LBS provider returns service responses back to users, and then the entire LBS process is completed. Since the subcloaking area selection method has randomness, the real user location might be contained in the subcloaking area or not. Hence, even if an adversary manages to know about the cloaking area reported to LBS provider, it is still quite difficult to find out the real user location. In this way, an effective location privacy protection will be achieved. The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
(1) By using an improved LBS system model, this paper constructs a distributed framework in order to isolate Location Anonymization Sever and LBS provider, which will prevent user information disclosure through untrusted server or LBS provider and realize a function separation of QoS-guarantee and location privacy protection to improve the system efficiency. (2) This paper designs a subcloaking area selection algorithm, which enables users to seek a specific cloaking area within a large cloaking area on the condition of satisfying their individual demands, making it truly user-demand-driven. (3) This paper proposes new quantitative and normalized representations of QoS as well as location privacy demand and introduces two boundary parameters, namely, location privacy security distance 1 and QoS-guaranteed distance 2 to determine the value of QoS demand and location privacy protection Location privacy protection method
Regulatory method
Privacy policybased method
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Obfuscation-based method demand, which makes the subcloaking area selection more reasonable.
(4) The entire cloaking area computation process in this paper does not need to assume that the server has known users' next locations, which is more realistic.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The second section summarizes related works on location privacy protection. The third section defines problems and introduces the traditional system model. The fourth section presents the improved system model and three core algorithms of location privacy protection. The simulation analysis of feasibility is detailed in the fifth section, and section six concludes this paper and puts forward some future research directions.
Related Works
As shown in Figure 1 , existing location privacy protection methods can be roughly divided into four categories: regulatory method, privacy policy-based method, anonymitybased method, and obfuscation-based method [8] . Among them, the development of anonymity-based and obfuscationbased methods is more thorough, making them two major directions of research on location privacy protection.
Anonymity-based method is also named time-space cloaking technology, among which k-anonymity method is the most well-known and is applied in location privacy protection by Gruteser and Grunwald for the first time [9] . By employing the quadtree data structure, k-anonymity method is able to guarantee that a cloaking area of one user contains at least − 1 other users. Thus, k users in the same area are indistinguishable from each other. In this way, the possibility of distinguishing each user is reduced to 1/k from 1. Inspired by the k-anonymity method, Wang et al. came up with a perception-based method, where Location Anonymization Server was able to meet users' diversified privacy demands in both temporal and spatial dimensions [8] . Reference [10] proposed a new incremental clique-based cloaking algorithm using k-anonymity method to cope with the scenario where different location-based queries are continuously launched. Hu and Xu proposed a method in which users' concrete location information was not necessary [11] . Reference [12] designed a subcloaking area selection algorithm to protect location privacy by returning a smaller cloaking area. Reference [13] proposed a privacy personalization framework, where is user-defined. However, this method was only suitable for the situations where the value of was small, and, furthermore, the long delay and low anonymity success rate were two main defects of it. Bhuvan et al. adopted the privacy grid of Bottom-up and Top-down [14] . In this method, users could appoint their own privacy demands and the minimum cloaking area A and realize a high anonymity success rate. However, it was time-consuming and with high update cost. In contrast, the circular partitioning method proposed by Zhao et al. can improve the anonymity degree but is less realistic [15] .
Obfuscation-based method protects location privacy by producing a virtual user location or by separating locations from identities. Duckham and Kulik pointed out that the obfuscation-based method was one of the most important methods in location privacy protection and proposed a new obfuscation approach, in which users could balance privacy demands and QoS through the negotiation with the LBS provider [16] . Reference [17] proposed a dummy method, in which the server produced virtual location information according to real user locations and mixed them to protect location privacy. However, attackers were able to distinguish real users from virtual users through long-term tracking. The algorithm improved by You et al. [18] increased the continuity of virtual location generation, making those virtual locations more authentic. Ghinita et al. came up with a new Private Information Retrieval based framework [19] to divide the whole space into different modules. In this way, users could extract the necessary information without leaking concrete locations because users could only get access to the information stored in their own modules. The two algorithms mentioned above have achieved remarkable results in privacy protection. However, the calculation complexity and communication cost of their works were just high. To handle the source-consuming issue, [20] put forward a distributed obfuscation method, which was able to reduce one half computation expense, but it was still high-cost compared with k-anonymity method.
System Model and Problem Definition

Problem Definition
3.1.1. Edge Information Attack. Edge information attack frequently occurs while applying k-anonymity method [12] . Considering the scenario shown in Figure 2 and supposing that user 1 defines a location privacy protection of degree 3, that is, = 3, when = 1 , the cloaking area after anonymization is the blue shadow zone in Figure 2 (a) and when = 2 , the cloaking area changes to the orange shadow zone in Figure 2 (b). Therefore, the common user set is { 1 , 4 }, so actually, k is reduced to 2.
The concept of edge information attack is that, by comparing the user information in two different cloaking areas, such as users' location coordinates and LBS query traces, those who are not in the common user set (here { 3 , 5 }) will be eliminated; that is, the edge user information will be detected and removed, which results in a decrease of and reducing the privacy protection degree.
Limitations of Existing Approaches.
To counter the edge information attack, literature [8] proposed a cloaking area algorithm based on the common user set. In this algorithm, a cloaking area should meet not only the individual demand for k, but also the demand of all the users in the common user set for . Although the algorithm is thoughtful, on the one hand, the calculation cost will dramatically increase due to the consideration of all the users in a set; on the other hand, since each user's location in the next moment will affect the calculation of the coverage area, the premise of using this algorithm is to know users' future locations, which is obviously unrealistic. In summary, although existing approaches such as the method proposed in [8] have acquired good results, limitations still cannot be ignored:
(1) Calculating the public privacy value in unit of userset, instead of considering the different privacy levels demanded by different users, cannot meet individual demands for privacy security. (2) Assumption that next-moment location of each user is known by Location Anonymization Server is not feasible. (3) The purpose of this algorithm is to find the smallest coverage area, namely, maximizing the QoS, which neglects the trade-off between QoS and the degree of privacy protection. (4) While applying this algorithm at high population density places (e.g., classrooms or meeting rooms), it is still likely to expose users' locations, because, in this kind of scenario, the value of is easily fulfilled. (5) Excessive calculation may be caused, especially while considering that some users may have continuous privacy demands.
Traditional LBS System
Model. The traditional LBS system is composed of three parts [8] , including user, Location Anonymization Server, and LBS provider, as shown in Figure 3 . In this model, Location Anonymization Server acts as a bridge, which is responsible for cloaking area generation and link connection between users and LBS provider. LBS query is represented in the form of ( , , , ), where represents the user, indicates the time when a query is launched, = ( , ) is a location tracker built into mobile devices, ( , ) expresses the two-dimension coordinates of user location, and represents a user-desired degree of location privacy protection. Terminal users firstly send their LBS queries to Location Anonymization Server, and then the server will generate a cloaking area using k-anonymity method and send it to LBS provider. Later, according to the cloaking area received, LBS provider will return service responses back to users via Location Anonymization Server.
However, several drawbacks exist in this model. On the one hand, the model assumes by default that Location Anonymization Server is trusted. But in reality, the trustworthiness cannot always be assured. LBS queries containing users' location information might be divulged to LBS provider easily via malicious servers. On the other hand, because of the central position of Location Anonymization Server, service responses cannot be returned to users directly, which will lead to a longer service delay. Furthermore, Location Anonymization Server has to allocate some extra resources to deal with the information transit, causing a waste of resource.
Proposed Location Privacy
Protection Scheme 4.1. Improved LBS System Model. Hence, in order to make up for those defects present in the traditional system model, this paper draws on the experience of [12] and introduces an improved LBS system model as shown in Figure 4 (a). The improved model transforms from Location Anonymization Server-centric into user-centric, which highlights the dominant position of users. In this model, the LBS query is expressed in the form of ( , , , , ToS). Here, the denotation "LBS query" is denoted exclusively as the query to Location Anonymization Server. It is a query launched by the user when he/she wants to obtain some location-based services. In the same time of initiating a LBS query, the user will extract the parameter called type of service (ToS) from the query ( , , , , ToS) and then send it to LBS provider. There are two differences from the conventional form.
(i) First, = ( , min ) where indicates the privacy protection degree, namely, the minimal number of users in a cloaking area, and min denotes the minimal size of a cloaking area.
(ii) Second, an extra parameter type of service (ToS) is added to inform LBS provider that the service required by the user, and then LBS provider will generate the QoS-guaranteed distance 2 according to ToS. The parameter 2 indicates the maximum distance between the subcloaking area and user position so as to get the most optimal QoS. min is denoted to avoid the situations where the population density is too high to easily satisfy the value of in a small area. Sometimes, in places such as classrooms and cinemas, the number of users in the smallest square could be more than . In this way, without a lower bound min , the cloaking area sent to LBS provider would not be large enough to protect the location privacy of mobile users.
In this new system model, Location Anonymization Server provides independent service for each user. Firstly, when the server records a user's LBS query, at this moment, it will produce a cloaking area and return it to the user. Further, the user selects a smaller area called subcloaking area a(c) within by using a selection algorithm and then sends it to LBS provider. Finally, LBS provider directly returns the query response to the user. Thus, based on the system mentioned above, the bridge between users and LBS provider is no longer necessary. It is the user who solely screens the cloaking area and directly gets access to the service returned from LBS provider, isolating Location Anonymization Server and LBS provider and avoiding user information disclosure. According to the selection algorithm, a(c) may or may not contain the real user location. Compared to the conventional LBS system model, there are several advantages of the improved one.
(i) First, Location Anonymization Server provides independent service for each user and users can completely express their individual demands through the selection of subcloaking area. (ii) Second, realizing the isolation of Location Anonymization Server and LBS provider can strongly reduce the probability of user information disclosure caused by malicious servers or providers. (iii) Third, by applying the improved model, a function separation between Location Anonymization Server and LBS provider is realized, and a distributed system framework is formed, as shown in Figure 4 (b). Location Anonymization Server is specifically responsible for location privacy protection, and LBS provider is dedicated to QoS-guarantee. Moreover, the balance between the two sides is determined by users, which will significantly reduce the service delay and save system resources.
Data
Structure. Similar to the approach presented in [8] , a quadtree is used to recursively partition the whole spatial domain into squares, as shown in Figure 5 .
The whole spatial domain is partitioned into levels (L is predefined by Location Anonymization Server, without further change). Every layer is partitioned into 4 −1 squares, where indicates the number of levels. When > 1, every large square in level −1 is able to be partitioned into 4 smaller squares in level . In the end, there is only one large square in level 1 and 4 −1 small squares in the most bottom level.
For each user location = ( , ), there is one and only one square area corresponding to it in each level, which is possible to be the cloaking area returned by Location Anonymization Server, whereas which level is the exact cloaking area c depends on users' demands of privacy.
Definition of Parameters.
Here again, in order to be clear, the definitions of several parameters are given. First of all, two practical scenarios are necessary to be introduced to facilitate the comprehension. Scenario 1. When a user asks for the nearest supermarket location, even the cloaking area sent to LBS provider that is only a few meters away from his/her real location, the service result may be far from the reality, which means the probability of generating errors of LBS response is high.
When a user asks about the weather, even the cloaking area reported to LBS provider that is several kilometers away, the feedback might be right. . . .
(a)
LBS request at (x, y) . . . Figure 5 : Spatial domain partitioning method using a quadtree (revised from [8] ).
(b)
Seen from the two different scenarios above, it is evident that, for different types of service, the requirements for QoS and location privacy protection are also different. For example, service like navigation requires for a small cloaking area to achieve a certain precision, and, therefore, leading to a higher location privacy protection degree; service like weather query requires for a relative large cloaking area, therefore resulting in a lower location privacy degree.
Hence, we define a parameter called type of service (ToS) to indicate which type of service is being asked for by the user. By allocating different values to ToS, the service type is declared.
And when Location Anonymization Server receives ToS, it will generate a parameter called the location privacy security distance 1 , which means that, in order to protect the location privacy, the distance between the subcloaking area and the real user position should be no less than 1 .
Similarly, when LBS provider receives ToS, it will generate another parameter called the QoS-guaranteed distance 2 , which means that, in order to guarantee QoS, the distance between the subcloaking area and the real user position should be no more than 2 .
It is worth mentioning that, in this paper, 1 and 2 are two empirical bound values predefined without calculation. By means of analyzing massive actual instances, it is assumed that Location Anonymization Server and LBS provider could estimate empirically the two boundary values according to the type of service.
Quantification and Normalization of Privacy Demand
Value and QoS. The design of cloaking-area-based location privacy protection algorithm must take into consideration the three factors below: privacy demand value (denoted by P), QoS demand (denoted by Q), and the attack ability of adversaries [21] . From the point of view of users, the larger and farther the cloaking area obtained by LBS provider is and the greater the number of users in it is, the higher degree of privacy protection is, but oppositely the quality of service is lower. In a word, the privacy protection demand value increases with the number of users in the cloaking area; however the QoS descends instead. In addition, the higher the adversary ability is, the worse the reliability of location privacy protection is. In this paper, in order to simplify the analysis of the relation between location privacy protection and QoS, it is assumed that the attack ability of every adversary is equal.
(i) The Quantitative Representation of Privacy Demand Value
. The quantitative representation form of privacy demand value is given as below:
= distance ( ( ) , ( , )) ,
where distance( ( ), ( , )) denotes the Euclidean distance between the center of the cloaking area and the real user location = ( , ).
(ii) The Quantitative Representation of QoS Demand . In this paper, the QoS demand value is calculated using the distance between the real user location and the farthest point in the subcloaking area ( ), as given below:
where max(distance ( ( ), ( , ))) = max(| |, | |, | |, | |) and | |, | |, | |, | | denotes, respectively, the Euclidean distance between the real user location = ( , ) and four vertexes of ( ). The lemma and proof are detailed in [12] , and we do not recount them here again. a parameter ( ∈ [0, 1]) is introduced. Users can adjust dynamically the priority of privacy protection by defining the value of . Here, two different cases should be differentiated.
(1) When 1 < 2 , ≥ 1 , and ≤ 2 , then and are both equal to 1, that is, the most optimal situation where QoS and location privacy protection are both completely satisfied and guaranteed. As a result, there is no need for the user to define anymore because the object of protecting location privacy without decreasing QoS has been already achieved.
(2) When 1 > 2 , < 1 , and > 2 then and both belong to (0, 1) and there will be a conflict between privacy protection and QoS-guarantee. In this time, P and are not both optimal, and therefore the user can adjust the value of to express individual demands, meaning that the user can choose to attach more importance to location privacy protection or to QoS. Actually, a greater value of represents a higher priority of privacy location protection. And, in this case, LBS demand is given as below. The object is to find the minimal subcloaking area ( ) which maximizes R:
(3)
Algorithm Design and Analysis.
In this section, the three core algorithms applied in DUDD location privacy protection scheme will be presented in detail, namely, parameters generation algorithm (composed of Algorithms 1 and 2), subcloaking area selection algorithm (composed of Algorithms 3 and 4), and user side process algorithm.
Algorithm of Parameters Generation.
Employing the kanonymity method, Location Anonymization Server generates and returns a cloaking area for every user. Beginning with the smallest square which contains the user location, Location Anonymization Sever will move upwards one level every time until the value of is satisfied. The server will then check if min is guaranteed. In the end, the server will return to the user a cloaking area under the premise of satisfying and min simultaneously. Moreover, according to the parameter ToS in the LBS query, Location Anonymization Server and LBS provider will, respectively, generate their restrictions on the distance between users' actual location and the subcloaking area, as described in Algorithms 1 and 2.
Algorithm of Subcloaking Area Selection and User Side
Process. After receiving the cloaking area returned from Location Anonymization Server, users will select a subcloaking area a(c) within and send ( ) to LBS provider. Actually,
} is a set of four candidate subcloaking areas of cloaking area . It is worth mentioning that 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 are four smaller squares obtained by dividing according to the data structure presented in Section 4.2.
The algorithms of subcloaking area selection and user side process are detailed in Algorithms 3 and 5.
Since there are four candidates in the set of subcloaking area { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 }, an iterative selection is necessary so as to finally pick out a(c). The iterative selection algorithm is detailed in Algorithm 4.
By Algorithms 3 and 4, users can balance the privacy demand and QoS by adjusting when there is a conflict between privacy protection and QoS-guarantee. The subcloaking area ( ) is generated randomly, so it might contain the real user location or not. Thus, even if the adversary gets the subcloaking area ( ), it is not easy to tell if this area covers the real user location or not.
After the execution of Algorithms 3 and 4, the most optimal subcloaking area a(c) will be picked out. In general, the user's next move is to send a(c) to LBS provider and to get the service response in return. However, sometimes, in order to guarantee QoS, LBS provider will have its own restriction on the size of a(c), and generally it demands a smaller area than a(c). Therefore, in line 5 of Algorithm 5, considering that LBS provider might have restriction on the subcloaking area size, it is necessary to select a smaller region ( ) within a(c) according to the requirement of LBS provider. Here we use a circle to represent ( ). If LBS provider has no specific restriction, then step 5 will be neglected.
In lines 6 to 9 of Algorithm 5, it is considered that sometimes users might send the same LBS query for several times during a short time interval but they are not leaving the cloaking area . Therefore, in order to not waste the computation time of the server, a location tracker PM is set to verify if the user location is out of boundaries of the cloaking area . If the user location is no longer within the range of the cloaking area c, it is allowed to send the same query again. If not, the response of the last query will be returned to the user.
Feasibility Simulation Results and Analysis
The feasibility simulation results of the proposed DUDD location privacy protection scheme are given in this section. The software MATLAB is used to conduct the simulation. Here, the value of the parameter ToS is predefined in order to simplify the simulation. The simulation parameters are shown in Table 1 .
Location Anonymization Server Side.
On Location Anonymization Server side, a 5-level quadtree model is constructed within a square region, and the whole square region is partitioned using the method presented in Section 4.1, as shown in Figure 6 .
Input: LBS query ( , , , , ToS); A quadtree ; The total number of levels ; The privacy demand value and the minimum area required ( , min ) is included in . Output: Cloaking Area and 1 .
(1) Initialize a LBS request ( , , , , ToS), send it entirely to Location Anonymization Server. (2) According to ToS, Location Anonymizatiton Server generates 1 .
(3) Find the leaf area ( ) (i.e. the minimum square area) in quadtree where is located the user location and represents the current level in the quadtree . At the beginning, is supposed to be , that is the bottom level of . (4) while the number of users in < , do (5) Let = − , that is move upwards levels until is fulfilled. (6) end while (7) while (the area of ) < min , do (8) Let = − 1, that is move upwards one level until min is fulfilled. Then, 53 points are generated at random to represent 53 different user locations and they are distributed randomly within a square whose vertex coordinates are (4, 8), (6, 8) , (6, 10) , and (4, 10), as shown in Figure 7(a) . Suppose that, at present, the location coordinate of user is (4.5, 8.6), that is, one of the 53 points. When this user sends a LBS query to Location Anonymization Server, a cloaking area is returned afterwards, that is, the red zone in Figure 7 (a). Within the cloaking area c, 4 subcloaking areas are presented and, respectively, named as 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 in the counterclockwise direction, just as shown in Figure 7 (b).
User Side.
On user side, according to the value of , a specific subcloaking area ( ) is selected from { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 }. Here, two different situations are distinguished.
(i) LBS Provider Has No Restriction on the Subcloaking Area
Size Selected by the User. Suppose that user is still at point (4.5, 8.6); is set as 0.5; that is, the privacy protection demand and the QoS demand are equal. By comparing the value of in every subcloaking area, that is, 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 in Figure 7(b) , the program chooses to return the subcloaking area 4 where performs a maximum, as shown in Figure 8 .
(ii) LBS Provider Has Restriction on the Subcloaking Area Size
Selected by the User. Suppose that LBS provider requires that the subcloaking area offered by the user should be no more than 0.8. Then, a circle area of 0.8 will be selected within ( ) and returned to LBS provider, as shown in Figure 9 . Through data analysis, several conclusions can be made:
(1) The randomness of algorithms:
(i) for point (4.5, 8.6), when gets different values in [0, 1] as shown in the table, the subcloaking area is either 2 or 4 , randomly distributed; for point (4.8, 8.9), the subcloaking area is either 2 or 3 , randomly distributed; (ii) for the same value of , the result is different based on user's location. And, for two points in the same area (e.g., the two points selected here are both in area 2 ), even when they are very close to each other, the distribution of subcloaking area selection result is different when changes.
Because of this kind of randomness, it becomes more difficult for LBS provider to find out the real user location, making location privacy protection more effective.
(2) The assignment of :
(i) for a single user, when is assigned a small value, it tends to get the subcloaking area nearer to the real user position; however, when is assigned a large value, it tends to get the subcloaking area farther from the real user position.
Therefore, if the user chooses location privacy protection over QoS, a larger value should be selected (usually greater than 0.5) and if the user needs a better QoS, a smaller value should be selected (usually less than 0.5).
Multiuser Situation.
In Section 5.3.1, only two users located in 2 are taken, for example, to simulate the twouser situation. Hence, here in this subsection, all the different user locations in area 1 and 3 are selected to simulate the multiuser situation. For each user located in area 1 , the same simulation process is conducted and a subcloaking area will be finally picked out from { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 }. Then the number of users falling in each subcloaking area { 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 } will be counted, that is, how many users selected 1 as the final subcloaking area, how many users selected 2 , and so forth. In the end, the proportion of users falling in each subcloaking area is calculated, respectively, and is described with bar graph, as illustrated in blue in Figure 10(a) , the same for the users located in 3 , as illustrated in red in Figure 10(a) .
Several conclusions can be made:
(1) When gets identical values, for users in different areas, the subcloaking area selection results are unevenly distributed; when gets different values, for users in identical areas, the subcloaking area selection results are still unevenly distributed.
(2) In reality, is defined all by users according to their own actual situations, which will bring a great randomness to the subcloaking area selection. Therefore, even if the adversary can manage to know the subcloaking area reported to LBS provider, it is extremely difficult to find out the real user location, which will prevent the edge attack effectively and realize the location privacy protection.
Subcloaking Area Selection Rule.
Firstly, several definitions are given below.
(i) Initial Subcloaking Area. It is the subcloaking area where users are when they launch their LBS queries.
(ii) Diagonal Subcloaking Area. It is the subcloaking area which is in the diagonal direction of the initial subcloaking area.
(iii) Clockwise Neighbor Subcloaking Area. It is the adjacent subcloaking area of the initial subcloaking area, in the clockwise direction. (iv) Counterclockwise Neighbor Subcloaking Area. It is the adjacent subcloaking area of the initial subcloaking area, in the counterclockwise direction.
For example, as shown in Figure 7(b) , if 3 is defined as the initial subcloaking area, then 1 is the diagonal subcloaking area of 3 , 2 , and 4 which are, respectively, the clockwise and counterclockwise subcloaking areas.
Then, upon analyzing the simulation results of all the 53 users, a broken line graph illustrating the probability that the subcloaking area falls into initial and diagonal subcloaking areas at different values is given in Figure 11 .
Similarly, the probability that the subcloaking area falls into clockwise and counterclockwise subcloaking areas at different values is described in Figure 12 .
With the analysis of Figures 11 and 12 , a few conclusions can be conducted:
(1) In the interval [0, 1], when approaches to 0, it is more likely to select the initial subcloaking area.
(2) When approaches to 1, it is more likely to select the diagonal subcloaking area.
(3) When ∈ [0.1, 0.9], the probability of falling into the diagonal subcloaking area augments dramatically and, in contrast, that of falling into the initial subcloaking area falls sharply.
(4) With the increase of , the probability of falling into the clockwise and counterclockwise subcloaking areas shows the same tendency of a first increase then decrease, reaching the maximum when fluctuates around 0.5.
Those abovementioned conclusions fit well with the actual situation. In reality, when is small, it means that users pay more attention to QoS rather than to location privacy protection. Therefore, in order to gain a high QoS, the initial subcloaking area should be returned because it is closer to the real user location. Otherwise, when augments, it means that now users attach more importance to location privacy protection. As a consequence, the diagonal subcloaking area will be returned because it is farther from the real user location. When fluctuates around 0.5, users hope to preserve their location privacy and obtain a high QoS at the same time. Hence, adjacent subcloaking areas will be returned.
Simulation Result When Increases.
When gets bigger, the cloaking area generated via Algorithm 2 at the same user location (4.5, 8.6) might be the same as before or not. If it is not the same, the level of the new cloaking area must become higher, which means that the subcloaking area corresponding will also change.
Here, it is assumed that equals 100, and the level of cloaking area moves upwards only one to level 3. Then, according to Algorithm 2, the new cloaking area becomes the square whose vertex coordinates are (4, 8), (8, 8) , (8, 12) , (4, 12) , as shown in Figure 13 (a). Four subcloaking areas are, respectively, named as 1 , 2 , 3 , 4 , and each of them corresponds to a square area in level 4, as shown in Figure 13(b) .
Take all the different user locations in 3 to conduct the same simulation process. The simulation result is shown in Figure 14 (a).
Seen from Figure 14 , several conclusions can be made:
(1) When increases, the subcloaking area selection result after the anonymization process is still unevenly distributed; that is, the randomness of algorithm remains unchanged no matter the size of .
(2) However, it is obvious that the probability of choosing diagonal subcloaking area significantly increases with the augmentation of . It is because the augmentation of means that a higher degree of location privacy protection is in need, so the subcloaking area will be farther from the real user location in order to realize a higher location privacy protection degree. 
Conclusion and Future Works
With the increasing importance of location privacy protection, various methods have been proposed over the past few years to preserve the location privacy. However, it is observed that few approaches take individual demands into consideration and seek a balance between the privacy protection and QoS, which matters a lot in real scenarios. Hence, in this paper, a new distributed user-demand-driven location privacy protection scheme is proposed, an improved LBS system model is introduced, and a user-defined weight parameter is used to realize a balance between location privacy protection and QoS. A subcloaking area will be found under the premise of protecting location privacy and guaranteeing QoS. The feasibility simulation results prove the effectiveness and feasibility of the proposed method. Nevertheless, there are still lots of future work to do. First, which value should be allocated to ToS in accordance with the type of service requires further consideration. Second, the accuracy of the two quantitative models should be improved in the future research. Third, some integrated metrics are needed to evaluate if user demands are really fulfilled.
